proponents of a policy mix consider complementary instruments to carbon pricing such as efficiency standards or feed-in tariffs justified.
Second, applying evolutionary economics, path dependencies matter (Kosinowsky/Groth 2011). Investments in the energy sector are highly asset specific: They are only designated for this specific purpose and, once made, are irreversible. But current investment decisions are made based on a cost structure that distorts competition in many ways, e.g. due to substantial subsidies for fossil fuels and nuclear energy vs. the externalization of respective negative environmental and health effects in the past. In this artificial situation, distortions lead to investments in a long-term sub-optimal electricity generation path and prevent investments in fundamentally new technologies. A carbon pricing scheme such as the EU ETS alone cannot provide a sufficient remedy for this "carbon [and nuclear] lock-in" (Fischedick/Samadi 2010: 24) . Instead, as long-term oriented investments are needed, a renewable energy support system such as the German FIT provides planning reliability and helps overcoming established structures.
Third, according to political economy reasoning (Gawel et al. 2014) , it is very likely that decisions on crucial design features of carbon pricing schemes such as the ETS cap size are rather based on the political acceptability than on environmental necessities or overall abatement costs. Hence, real-world cap-and-trade schemes will probably never be neither cost efficient nor sufficiently effective. But instead of utterly condemning the instrument, complementing a politically weakened ETS with additional measures could be a more reasonable alternative.
Forth, political consulting has to take into consideration real-life political and institutional constraints instead of asking the world to adapt to economic models (Hansjürgens 2012: 11) . Besides the above mentioned barriers to perfect carbon markets, institutional constraints have to be taken into account. In politics, these involve policy making styles, institutional arrangements, and multi-level governance structures. In the latter case, modern literature on environmental federalisms suggests that supranational carbon markets should be complemented by national or even regional policies in order to cope with specific local circumstances (Morotomi 2014) .
And fifth, the energy transformation towards a nuclear-free low carbon society calls for profound changes in the socio-technological system (Hansjürgens 2012: 11) . Carbon price signals alone might not be enough to trigger the changes necessary, spanning from technological infrastructure issues such as the power grid structure to socio-economic questions on the sustainability of modern lifestyles.
Weighing the arguments, we are convinced that in order to realize a nuclear-free de-carbonization by the end of this century we need to rely on a well-balanced policy mix. But if so, what could be criteria for the design of such a policy mix?
2.2 The sustainability of a policy mix Sustainability was established as an important guiding principle for public policy at the Rio Summit in 1992 (Lerch/Nutzinger 2002) . Ever since, besides intra-and intergenerational justice, three pillarsenvironment, society, economy -and five notions of stringency -from very weak to very stronghave been emphasized. In the latter case, even the rather unpretentious concept of critical sustainability calls for boundaries, safe minimum standards or environmental guardrails.
Applying these basic ideas to energy and climate policy, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and social justice should be guiding principles . Concerning the environment, issues such as climate protection, air pollution control, responsible resource and land use or nuclear safety have to be considered. Exemplifying for the first and the last, fairly clear criteria can be identified. In climate protection, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) scientifically founded -and the global community even publically acknowledged at the Copenhagen Summit -the 2°C target as a safe minimum standard, which calls for emission reductions of 80-90% in industrialized countries by 2050. This de-carbonization of energy supply calls for a fuel switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Nuclear energy, although carbon-free, cannot be considered sustainable, because of the high risk related to nuclear accidents and the still unsolved questions around nuclear waste treatment. Thus, any climate and energy policy mix has to be evaluated against the guardrail of a nuclear-free de-carbonization. While the operationalization of such a guardrail is certainly still quite a challenge, some evaluation criteria such as a policy's accuracy in reaching pre-given targets, its suitability for target adjustment in the case of new knowledge, its capability to set long-term innova-tion incentives, its ability to deal with carbon leakage, and its fitness to prevent rebound effects have already been developed and applied to carbon cap-and-trade . For policy interaction Oikonomou/Jepma (2008) developed a framework and additionally pointed to the importance of energy effectiveness, which refers solely to specific energy targets such as security of supply.
In the case of economic criteria, the definition of an optimal level of pollution and a complete internalization of externalities remains impossible, leaving cost efficiency as the guiding principle (Baumol/Oates 1971) . Market-based approaches such as energy taxes or carbon cap-and-trade are considered cost-efficient and have reduced compliance cost by up to 50% compared to command-andcontrol in various cases in practice (Ellerman et al. 2000) . But as outlined above, even many economic arguments support the call for complementing measures in order to cope with multiple externalities, lock-ins, and politics-induced problems. Again, nuclear energy must be excluded, simply because of actual costs being higher than those of many alternative energy resources (Oshima 2014) . Thus, a nuclear-free de-carbonization needs well-designed market-based approaches, combined with other instruments in such a way that the combination does not set perverse incentives jeopardizing carbon pricing's cost efficiency. In addition to overall cost-efficiency and company-level flexibility, the minimization of administrative and transaction costs, the prevention of (further) competitive distortions, and the definition of clear property rights are important criteria ). For policy interaction, Oikonomou/Jepma (2008) also point to the importance of preventing double regulation -a situation, in which one target group is affected by more than one policy instrument that achieve the same objectives -and double counting -which occurs when the targets for the same emissions are assigned to different obligated parties. Double counting can be further differentiated into double coverage, double crediting, and double slippage. Double coverage occurs when the same emission allowance is required twice in order to address the same target quantity in e.g. two interlinked carbon cap-and-trade schemes; double crediting happens when two allowances are generated from one reduction action; and double slippage occurs when an emission is neither covered by one nor the other scheme. Also, a climate-energy policy mix can be evaluated against its ability to foster an energy market liberalization.
The main line of discussion on social justice aspects of the energy transformation in Germany has so far focused on the criteria of electricity price effects (Heindl et al. 2014) . At least two arguments sup-port the notion that the financial burden resulting from the energy transformation is significantly higher for poor households than for rich households. First, energy prices are regressive in so far as the relative burden for poor households is bigger than for rich households. Second, poor households are less capable of short-run reactions to higher energy prices such as buying more efficient appliances or replacing heating systems. In addition, due to the trend of a widening income spread, the share of households threatened by poverty has increased in many industrialized countries. Thus, poor households appear to shoulder a bigger part of the energy transformation than rich households, a steadily increasing share of low-income households have to spend a steadily increasing part of their income on energy, and altogether the energy transformation so far can be considered unfair -a specifically obvious example being poor people living in small apartments subsidizing solar panels of house owners by paying the feed-in tariff apportionment. This notion is also underlined by a multi-level governance perspective, because e.g. in the case of renewable support schemes not all European power producers are treated equally, some German Länder subsidize other Länder, and German energy intensive industries are at least partly exempted from the apportionment. Hence, energy price effects have to be a major criteria for judging the sustainability of a climate and energy policy mix. In addition, for policy interaction, Oikonomou/Jepma (2008) also mention employment, business opportunities, and government revenues as relevant criteria.
However, it should not be forgotten that the energy transformation also fosters social justice, because a nuclear-free, decarbonized energy supply would significantly lower the ecological rucksack passed on from the current to future generations. In addition, several other aspects of social justice such as procedural vs. result-based justice, have to be taken into consideration when evaluating the fairness of a climate and energy policy mix (Lerch 2011) . In an attempt to solve related issues, Rawls (1971) groundbreaking contribution calls for equality in terms of rights and freedom as well as chances and opportunities, and only accepts inequalities in income and capital, if they provide the highest benefit to the poorest compared to a situation of equality where the poorest benefit less. However, operationalizing this idea for policy mix design still remains a big challenge.
Altogether, we think it critically important to unequivocally define and apply sustainability criteria for a climate and energy policy mix. And as research as well as policy discussion on economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness are far more advanced than debates on social justice, we consider it necessary to put a stronger focus on the latter issue.
The feasibility of a policy mix
Public Choice wisdom has it that market-based environmental policies such as tradable emission permits or environmental taxes are difficult to implement (Kirchgässner/Schneider 2003). As a consequence, it seems very unlikely that carbon pricing schemes ambitious enough to incentivize a nuclearfree de-carbonization by the end of this century are politically feasible (Weber/Hey 2013); a fact also clearly supported by several empirical studies on cap-and-trade in the US (Ellerman et al. 2000) , the EU (Rudolph 2009 ) and Japan (Rudolph/Schneider 2012) . In line with these arguments, some economists claim that e.g. combining the EU ETS with other instruments such as the German feed-in tariff raises overall compliance costs and thus further increases covered industries' resistance to ambitious carbon pricing (Weimann 2008 ).
However, several arguments support the view that an ambitious policy mix might be easier to implement than a single adequate carbon pricing scheme (Gawel et al. 2014 ). First, if industries' would really care about total climate protection costs, they should support a least cost instrument such as carbon cap-and-trade or taxation; but in reality they don't. Public Choice already tells us that overall costefficiency features characteristics of a public good and that, instead, the attribution of costs to sectors or even individual economic units is the key factor for mobilizing opposition. Therefore, in many countries industry resistance to carbon pricing has been one of the major obstacles of cost-efficient climate policy (Rudolph 2009 , Rudolph/Schneider 2012 .
Second, if opposition against carbon pricing is mobilized by sectoral abatement costs borne by wellorganized interest groups rather than by overall climate protection costs, and if abatement cost in the regulated sectors are lower the smaller their share of total climate protection costs is, shifting burdens from well-organized industry groups to less organized groups such as households could increase the political feasibility of more ambitious carbon pricing schemes. Subsidizing renewable energies by a feed-in tariff mainly paid by households, although highly questionable from the fairness perspective, lowers sectoral abatement costs for industry covered by a carbon pricing scheme. Thus, it might even weaken industries' opposition to more ambitious carbon pricing scheme designs compared to the case of a sole economic instrument.
Third, technology support programs such as the German feed-in tariff, by overcoming path dependencies and carbon-nuclear lock-ins, could provide clean technologies on a large scale in time, which in turn might prevent sudden carbon price hikes and reduce cost uncertainty for industry.
Forth, supporting renewable energy and thus fostering the renewable energy industry creates a new potent political player in the energy policy discourse and weakens the relative influence of traditional fossil-fuel based utilities. And as providers of renewable energy greatly benefit from carbon pricing that burdens fossil-fuel based power production, they are possible proponents of ambitious carbon pricing schemes, providing the necessary stakeholder support.
And fifth, the necessary de-carbonization by a sole carbon pricing instrument would cause prohibitively high political costs. A carbon price capable of completely de-carbonizating energy supply would have to be between 70 (production costs of wind onshore) and 300 Euro per ton of CO 2 (production costs of photovoltaic). Compared to current price levels, the financial burden of an average German entity covered by the EU ETS would increase by at least 30 million Euros. This is because in the case of decarbonizing by a single pricing instrument, the energy transformation is organized by financially punishing established technologies and devaluing productive capital of politically influential industries.
Instead, partially de-carbonizing by financially supporting renewable energies might be politically less costly.
Altogether, while a policy mix still faces a lot of political barriers, there are reasons to believe that the political barriers of an energy transformation based on a single sufficiently stringent market-based instrument are higher than complementing insufficient carbon pricing with other policies such as renewable energy support schemes. However, the real political costs, related interests, and the actual power balance in the climate and energy policy realm still have to be analyzed in more detail.
Climate and energy policy in Japan

Policy programs and targets
In order to achieve a nuclear-free low-carbon society in Japan, energy-related CO 2 emission control measure have to be strengthened and the use of renewable energy has to be enhanced. Today, CO 2 emissions account for around 90% of Japanese GHG emissions and are still increasing (+2.8% in 2012 from the previous year). And despite of the one year anniversary of Japanese electricity supply without nuclear power on September 15, 2014, a phase-out strategy is not yet available.
In Japan, climate and energy policy issues used to be -and are partly still -discussed separately. Even before the Fukushima nuclear disaster on March 11, 2011, the former Japanese government led by the In addition, the Act included the renewable energy goal of a 10% share in total primary energy supply by 2020. A target for nuclear energy, however, was not set, because Japan's climate protection strategy at the time very much relied on the continuation of nuclear power use. Anyway, while the Act had passed the Lower House on May 18, 2010, it later failed in the Upper House.
After 3/11 significant doubt in the Japanese energy system led to DPJ's "Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment" (EECJ 2012) on September 14, 2012; a major step towards interlinking energy and climate policy. The green energy revolution was considered the main linkage, as the promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy would both lower CO 2 emissions and the dependence on nuclear energy, while at the same time securing a stable and inexpensive power supply. The Innovative Strategy referred to the 2010 Climate Act's GHG targets, and concretized energy policy targets: In order to achieve these aims, besides the feed-in tariff and the carbon tax, first and foremost, the government intended to liberalize the electricity market by eliminating regional monopolies, decentral-izing power supply, and decoupling generation and distribution. The nuclear phase-out was to be advanced by a strict limitation of the operating permits for nuclear power plants to 40 years, the limited re-start of plants considered safe by the newly established independent Nuclear Regulation Authority, and the abandonment of any plans to construct new plants. 
Policy instruments
Already the unsuccessful 2010 Climate Act proposed three specific policies to achieve its targets: (Rudolph/Schneider 2012) . Instead of an ETS, the DPJ went for a carbon tax and a feed-in tariff, mainly in order to overcome this opposition while at the same time at least partly fulfilling its former commitment to GHG and nuclear power dependency reduction.
With the aim of controlling energy-related CO 2 emissions, the Tax for Climate Change Mitigation was introduced in 2012. The tax is imposed on the consumption of fossil fuels such as petroleum, natural gas and coal. Specifically, by using the CO 2 emissions factor of each fuel, the tax rate per quantity unit is set in a way that each tax burden equals 289 Yen per ton of CO 2 . Hence, carbon tax rates vary between fuels. The carbon tax isadded onto the pre-existing petroleum and coal tax, the tax base of which is all fossil fuels (760 Yen/kl crude oil and petroleum products, 780 Yen/t for gaseous hydrocarbons, 670 Yen/t for coal). To mitigate the burden, carbon tax rates are only to be raised gradually in the future (Table 1 ) and exemptions and refunds are provided for certain fields such as imported and domestic volatile oil for petrochemical production. Tax revenues are to be used for various measures of energy-related CO 2 emission control, such as energy-saving measures, the promotion of renewable energy, and the clean and efficient use of fossil fuels. Thus, in terms of emission reductions, a revenue effect will add to the price effect.
As the carbon tax only started its operation on October 1, 2012, empirical results are limited. However, revenues are estimated to be 39.1 billion Yen for 2012 and 262.3 billion Yen for each year after 2016.
Thus, MoE (2010) estimates the sum of the revenue and the price effect to be a CO 2 reduction of 0.5% to 2.2% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels. Lee et al. (2012) modelled the potential economic and environmental effects and confirmed a 1-3% emission reduction but found no significant impact on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment.
The Japanese feed-in tariff (FIT) for renewable energy was launched on July 1, 2012. It obliges utilities to purchase electricity generated from photovoltaic, wind power, hydraulic power (below 30 MW), geothermal, and biomass based on a fixed-period fixed-price contract. Purchase rate and contract period are determined corresponding to the type and the form of installation as well as the scale of renewable energy resources ( Table 2) . The rates and periods are announced by METI, based on considerations by an independent committee and the ministries concerned. For the benefit of renewable energy electricity suppliers, special consideration are given in decisions on FIT rates for three years from the FIT-introduction. In order to cover additional costs of renewable energy, utilities may request customers to pay the Surcharge for Renewable Energy on top of the electricity price in proportion to electricity usage. However, customers affected by the 2011 earthquake and energy-intensive industries are exempted from the surcharge.
In terms of effects, while there have only been few studies, the Japan Renewable Energy Foundation presented early ex-post study results (JREF 2014a, b) . According to these studies, the share of renewable energy, mainly photovoltaic, in power generation has rapidly increased up to 2.5% in 2013 and 4.2% in the pe- The share of the surcharge in the total electricity rate is very low (Figure 2 ). Between 2010 and 2013 the final electricity rate has increased by 4.31 yen per Kilowatt hour for households, but the share of the surcharge is only 8% of the electricity rate (0.35 yen/kWh). Instead, the main factor for an increase in power prices is the increase of fossil fuel market prices. In sum, at the policy level, while an ambitious ETS failed due to the opposition of the Iron Triangle, the Japanese government implemented a low-level carbon tax and combined it with a rather ambitious FIT. While it is yet too early to judge the results, ex ante estimations show a very small emissions reSurcharge Electricity rate duction effect by the carbon tax, which is mainly caused by the use of revenues for climate protection; the FIT, however, is more promising in terms of environmental effects. But it is most certain that the emission reduction contribution even of the two instruments together is insufficient considering the challenges of climate protection. In terms of economic efficiency, carbon pricing continues to play only a minor role, so that market forces can only partially play their role in (re)directing resources to the most efficient use. In terms of social justice, major parts of the climate and energy policy costs are now born by Japanese households, while industry is protected from extra burdens in many ways.
However, it should not go without mentioning that, despite of the failure of a domestic ETS, combining a carbon tax with a feed-in tariff may have significantly increased their political feasibility after almost two decades of intense, but politically fruitless discussion on carbon pricing.
Conclusions
In search of guidance on the pathway to a sustainable climate and energy policy future with the sufficiently plausible target of a nuclear-free de-carbonization by the end of the century, we have found the theoretical arguments on the necessity of a policy mix convincing. The main reasons are the existence of multiple externalities, carbon and nuclear lock-ins, and the insufficiency of the political process to provide sufficiently ambitious carbon pricing schemes.
However, defining sustainability criteria for a policy mix remains a great challenge. While environmental economics has provided economic and environmental criteria for single climate policy instruments such as accuracy in meeting the target, innovation incentives, and cost efficiency, already defining criteria for a policy mix poses new questions. Still, as an interim result, we argue that marketbased approaches are preferable to support and regulation approaches and that, due to its environmental advantages, cap-and-trade is the most promising carbon pricing option. In addition, double regulation has to be avoided as well as setting contradicting incentives. For social justice issues, the challenges appear to be bigger. Already for single climate policy instruments justice criteria are not well defined, let alone for the use of multiple energy and climate policies. Still, as preliminary insights, we think that regressive effects of carbon pricing should be avoided as much as possible. But at carbon price levels sufficient to stimulate a nuclear-free de-carbonization, revenues of taxes or auctions most certainly have to be used for compensating poor communities or households. However, it also has to be kept in mind that a rapid nuclear-free de-carbonization even at currently high costs contribute to inter-generational justice, because it may prevent more serious climate and energy consequences in the future. Considering politics, we have found convincing arguments that the feasibility of a policy mix is higher than that of an equally ambitious sole carbon pricing. Major reasons for this belief are that a policy mix mobilizes new actors groups, spread compliance costs more widely, and provides early low-cost green technology alternatives.
In our case study on Japan, we have shown has neither targets ambitious enough to organize a nuclearfree de-carbonization be the end of this century nor an integrated energy and climate policy strategy do exist. In addition, Japan still does not use efficient, effective, and possibly even socially just marketbased approaches as the main pillars of its climate and energy policy. Hope however persists, as the year 2012 saw the introduction of a low-level carbon tax and an ambitious feed-in tariff. But still, emission reductions are expected to be insufficient, efficient market allocation of scarce resources will be limited, and current generation households as well as future generation will continue to carry heavy burdens in terms of possible negative impacts of global warming and continuing nuclear energy use.
However, while strong opposition to a nuclear-free de-carbonization persists in Japan, the debate around the 2010-2012 climate and energy proposals showed that the combination of instruments might actually increase the feasibility of a sustainable climate and energy policy mix.
But without doubt fairness and feasibility questions will dominate future discussions on a nuclear-free de-carbonization. Hence, we think that research efforts should reflect this focus more convincingly.
